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Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Clustered Scale-Free Networks under Different Initial Distributions |
LEI Chuang1 JIA Jian-Yuan1, CHEN Xiao-Jie2, CONG Rui1, WANG Long 1,2 |
| 1School of Mechano-electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi'an 7100712State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 |
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| Cite this article: |
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LEI Chuang JIA Jian-Yuan, CHEN Xiao-Jie, CONG Rui et al 2009 Chin. Phys. Lett. 26 080202 |
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Abstract The evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game is investigated under different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on scale-free networks with a tunable clustering coefficient. It is found that, on the one hand, cooperation can be enhanced with the increasing clustering coefficient when only the most connected nodes are occupied by cooperators initially. On the other hand, if cooperators just occupy the lowest-degree nodes at the beginning, then the higher the value of the clustering coefficient, the more unfavorable the environment for cooperators to survive for the increment of temptation to defect. Thereafter, we analytically argue these nontrivial phenomena by calculating the cooperation probability of the nodes with different degrees in the steady state, and obtain the critical values of initial frequency of cooperators below which cooperators would vanish finally for the two initial distributions.
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| Keywords:
02.50.Le
87.23.Ge
89.75.Hc
89.75.Fb
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Received: 19 January 2009
Published: 30 July 2009
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| PACS: |
02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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87.23.Ge
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(Dynamics of social systems)
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89.75.Hc
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(Networks and genealogical trees)
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89.75.Fb
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(Structures and organization in complex systems)
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