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Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with Heterogeneous Influential Effect on Regular Small-World Networks |
| WU Zhi-Xi;XU Xin-Jian;WANG Ying-Hai |
| Institute of Theoretical Physics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000 |
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| Cite this article: |
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WU Zhi-Xi, XU Xin-Jian, WANG Ying-Hai 2006 Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 531-534 |
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Abstract The effect of heterogeneous influence of different individuals on the maintenance of co-operative behaviour is studied in an evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game with players located on the sites of regular small-world networks. The players interacting with their neighbours can either co-operate or defect and update their states by choosing one of the neighbours and adopting its strategy with a probability depending on the payoff difference. The selection of the neighbour obeys a preferential rule: the more influential a neighbour, the larger the probability it is picked. It is found that this simple preferential selection rule can promote continuously the co-operation of the whole population with the strengthening of the disorder of the underlying network.
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02.50.Le
05.50.+q
87.23.Cc
89.65.-s
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Published: 01 March 2006
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| PACS: |
02.50.Le
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(Decision theory and game theory)
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05.50.+q
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(Lattice theory and statistics)
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87.23.Cc
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(Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation)
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89.65.-s
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(Social and economic systems)
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