Environment-Dependent Payoffs in Finite Populations
XU Wei-Hong, ZHANG Yan-Ling** , XIE Guang-Ming, FENG Xue
Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871
Abstract ：In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained.
出版日期: 2015-01-20
:
87.23.Cc
(Population dynamics and ecological pattern formation)
87.23.Ge
(Dynamics of social systems)
87.23.Kg
(Dynamics of evolution)
89.75.Fb
(Structures and organization in complex systems)
05.65.+b
(Self-organized systems)
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