A Security Proof of Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution: From the View of Information Theory
LI Fang-Yi1,2, YIN Zhen-Qiang1,2, LI Hong-Wei1,2, CHEN Wei1,2**, WANG Shuang1,2**, WEN Hao3, ZHAO Yi-Bo4, HAN Zheng-Fu1,2
1Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 2Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 3Information Engineering College, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023 4Anhui Qasky Quantum Science and Technology Co. Ltd., Wuhu 241002
Abstract：Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most serious. Recently, a measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108 (2012) 130503] was proposed and all detector side channel attacks are removed in this scheme. Here a new security proof based on quantum information theory is given. The eavesdropper's information of the sifted key bits is bounded. Then with this bound, the final secure key bit rate can be obtained.
. [J]. 中国物理快报, 2014, 31(07): 70302-070302.
LI Fang-Yi, YIN Zhen-Qiang, LI Hong-Wei, CHEN Wei, WANG Shuang, WEN Hao, ZHAO Yi-Bo, HAN Zheng-Fu. A Security Proof of Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution: From the View of Information Theory. Chin. Phys. Lett., 2014, 31(07): 70302-070302.
2014, Vol. 31 
