Randomness Effect on Cooperation in Memory-Based Snowdrift Game
ZHANG Ming-Feng1, WANG Bing-Hong1, WANG Wen-Xu2, TANG Chuan-Long1, YANG Rui1
1Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 2300262Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Randomness Effect on Cooperation in Memory-Based Snowdrift Game
1Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 2300262Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
摘要A memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) on spatial small-world networks is investigated. It is found that cooperation rate versus temptation shows some step structures on small-world networks, similar to the case on regular lattices. With the increment of rewiring probability based on four-neighbour regular lattices, more steps are observable. Interestingly, it is observed that cooperation rate peaks at a specific value of temptation, which indicates that properly encouraging selfish actions may lead to better cooperative behaviours in the MBSG on small-world networks. Memory effects are also discussed for different rewiring probabilities. Furthermore, optimal regions are found in the parameter planes. The strategy-related average degrees of individuals are helpful to understand the obtained results.
Abstract：A memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) on spatial small-world networks is investigated. It is found that cooperation rate versus temptation shows some step structures on small-world networks, similar to the case on regular lattices. With the increment of rewiring probability based on four-neighbour regular lattices, more steps are observable. Interestingly, it is observed that cooperation rate peaks at a specific value of temptation, which indicates that properly encouraging selfish actions may lead to better cooperative behaviours in the MBSG on small-world networks. Memory effects are also discussed for different rewiring probabilities. Furthermore, optimal regions are found in the parameter planes. The strategy-related average degrees of individuals are helpful to understand the obtained results.
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