Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Division of Work
LI Zhi-Hua1, WANG Bing-Hong1,2, LIU Run-Ran1, YANG Han-Xin1
1Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 2300262The Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai 200093
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Division of Work
LI Zhi-Hua1, WANG Bing-Hong1,2, LIU Run-Ran1, YANG Han-Xin1
1Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 2300262The Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai 200093
摘要We propose a new two-type-player prisoner's dilemma game based on the division of work on a square lattice, in which a fraction of the population μ are assigned type A and the rest B. In a one-shot two-player game, we let both of their original payoffs be scaled by a same multiplicative factor α>1, if two neighboring players are of different types; however we leave the payoffs unchanged if they are of the same type. Then we show that combined with the two-type setup, the square lattice can assist to induce different social ranks according to players' abilities to collect payoffs. Simulation results show that the density of cooperation is significantly promoted for a wide range of the temptation to defection parameters and that there are optimal values for both α and μ leading to the maximal cooperation level. We reach these results by analyzing the distribution of the players in the social ranks and we also show some typical snapshots of the system.
Abstract：We propose a new two-type-player prisoner's dilemma game based on the division of work on a square lattice, in which a fraction of the population μ are assigned type A and the rest B. In a one-shot two-player game, we let both of their original payoffs be scaled by a same multiplicative factor α>1, if two neighboring players are of different types; however we leave the payoffs unchanged if they are of the same type. Then we show that combined with the two-type setup, the square lattice can assist to induce different social ranks according to players' abilities to collect payoffs. Simulation results show that the density of cooperation is significantly promoted for a wide range of the temptation to defection parameters and that there are optimal values for both α and μ leading to the maximal cooperation level. We reach these results by analyzing the distribution of the players in the social ranks and we also show some typical snapshots of the system.
LI Zhi-Hua;WANG Bing-Hong;LIU Run-Ran;YANG Han-Xin. Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Division of Work[J]. 中国物理快报, 2009, 26(10): 108701-108701.
LI Zhi-Hua, WANG Bing-Hong, LIU Run-Ran, YANG Han-Xin. Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Division of Work. Chin. Phys. Lett., 2009, 26(10): 108701-108701.
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2009, Vol. 26 
