Quantum Stackelberg Duopoly of Continuous Distributed Asymmetric Information
WANG Xia1, YANG Xiao-Hua2, MIAO Lin1, ZHOU Xiang1, HU Cheng-Zheng1
1Department of Physics, Wuhan University, Wuhan 4300722Department of Control Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074
Quantum Stackelberg Duopoly of Continuous Distributed Asymmetric Information
WANG Xia1;YANG Xiao-Hua2;MIAO Lin1;ZHOU Xiang1;HU Cheng-Zheng1
1Department of Physics, Wuhan University, Wuhan 4300722Department of Control Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074
摘要The minimal quantization structure is employed to investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with continuous distributed asymmetric information, i.e. the first mover has incomplete information that obeys a continuous distribution while the second mover has complete information. It is found that the effects of the positive quantum entanglement on the outcomes exhibit many interesting features due to the information asymmetry. Moreover, although the first-mover advantage is counteracted by the information asymmetry, the positive quantum entanglement still enhances the first-mover advantage and improves the first-mover tolerance of the information asymmetry beyond the classical limit.
Abstract：The minimal quantization structure is employed to investigate the quantum version of the Stackelberg duopoly with continuous distributed asymmetric information, i.e. the first mover has incomplete information that obeys a continuous distribution while the second mover has complete information. It is found that the effects of the positive quantum entanglement on the outcomes exhibit many interesting features due to the information asymmetry. Moreover, although the first-mover advantage is counteracted by the information asymmetry, the positive quantum entanglement still enhances the first-mover advantage and improves the first-mover tolerance of the information asymmetry beyond the classical limit.
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2007, Vol. 24 
