Research on evolutionary games in a noisy environment is still a non-solved problem. By using Markov process, we build a dynamic model for two-player and two-strategy symmetric game in noisy environment. Some illustrative examples are presented and the results are determined by simulation experiments.
Research on evolutionary games in a noisy environment is still a non-solved problem. By using Markov process, we build a dynamic model for two-player and two-strategy symmetric game in noisy environment. Some illustrative examples are presented and the results are determined by simulation experiments.
LIU Wei-Bing;WANG Xian-Jia. Two-Player and Two-Strategy Symmetric Evolutionary Game with Fluctuations[J]. 中国物理快报, 2007, 24(10): 2762-2765.
LIU Wei-Bing, WANG Xian-Jia. Two-Player and Two-Strategy Symmetric Evolutionary Game with Fluctuations. Chin. Phys. Lett., 2007, 24(10): 2762-2765.
[1] Kandori M, Mailath G J and Rob R 1993 Econometrics 6129 [2] Amir M and Berninghaus S K 1996 Games and Economic Behaviour 14 19 [3] Tadj L and Touzene A 2003 Appl. Math. Model. 27 913 [4] Nowak M A, Sasaki A, Taylor C and Fudenberg D 2004 Nature. 428 646 [5] Foster D and Young P 1990 Theor. Popul. Biol. 38 219 [6] Fudenberg D and Maskin E 1990 Am. Econom. Rev. 80 274 [7] Wu J Z and Axelrod R 1995 J. Conflict Resolution 39 183 [8] Goeree J K and Holt C A 2004 Games and Economic Behaviour 46 365 [9] Nowak M A and Sigmund K 2004 Science 303 793
2007, Vol. 24 
