Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on a Weighted Scale-Free Network
CHENG Hong-Yan1,2, LI Hai-Hong1, DAI Qiong-Lin1, YANG Jun-Zhong1
1School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876 2Department of Physics, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on a Weighted Scale-Free Network
CHENG Hong-Yan1,2, LI Hai-Hong1, DAI Qiong-Lin1, YANG Jun-Zhong1
1School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876 2Department of Physics, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a weighted scale-free network where the diversity of teaching ability is introduced to the network in the form of weight. Though the diversity of teaching ability is not a sufficient condition for the enhancement of cooperation, we find that the degree-dependent teaching ability plays an active role in the evolution of cooperation. A new phenomenon is found when the degree-dependent teaching ability is used: the distribution of the cooperator frequency displays a two-peak structure for a certain parameter range. We also investigate the effects of the degree-degree correlation of the network on the evolution of cooperation in the presence of the diversity of the teaching ability.
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on a weighted scale-free network where the diversity of teaching ability is introduced to the network in the form of weight. Though the diversity of teaching ability is not a sufficient condition for the enhancement of cooperation, we find that the degree-dependent teaching ability plays an active role in the evolution of cooperation. A new phenomenon is found when the degree-dependent teaching ability is used: the distribution of the cooperator frequency displays a two-peak structure for a certain parameter range. We also investigate the effects of the degree-degree correlation of the network on the evolution of cooperation in the presence of the diversity of the teaching ability.
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2010, Vol. 27 
